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Wachstum ohne Nachhaltigkeit
Was die Finanzkrise über die russische Wirtschaft sagt
von Stefan Meister
Zusammenfassung
Der Anstieg der Preise für Öl und Gas seit 1999 war Voraussetzung für die wirt-
schaftliche und politische Stabilisierung Russlands. Als Ergebnis hat der internati-
onale Einfluss Russlands zugenommen. Das enorme Wirtschaftswachstum ist die 
Basis für ein neues außenpolitisches Selbstbewusstsein der russischen Elite. In den 
letzten acht Jahren hat Russland seine Auslandsschulden zurückgezahlt und einen 
konstant wachsenden Stabilitätsfond angelegt. Moskau hat damit Handlungsspiel-
raum gewonnen, um sich an der Vermittlung internationaler Konflikte zu beteili-
gen und in internationale Wirtschaftsinstitutionen zu integrieren.
Gleichzeitig existieren weiterhin grundlegende Defizite in der Umsetzung von 
Wirtschaftsreformen durch die russische Führung. Korruption, ineffektive Ver-
waltungsstrukturen sowie der wachsende Einfluss des Staates auf  die Wirtschaft 
haben grundlegende Reformen verhindert. Hinzu kommt, dass der hohe Ölpreis 
kurzfristig dazu beigetragen hat, wichtige Reformen zu verschleppen. Die rus-
sische Führung hat die Wachstumsjahre nicht genutzt, um wichtige Reformimpulse 
zu setzen. Die größten Herausforderungen für die russische Wirtschaft sind die 
Diversifizierung der Produktionsstruktur, die Stimulierung von Investitionen in 
allen Bereichen der Wirtschaft sowie die Erhöhung der öffentlichen Ausgaben für 
Infrastruktur, das Gesundheits- und Bildungswesen. 
Im internationalen Rahmen möchte sich das heutige Russland in alle wichtigen 
wirtschaftlichen Institutionen integrieren und auf  gleicher Augenhöhe mitreden. 
Gleichzeitig ist es bestrebt, z. B. im Energiesektor, die Regeln neu zu verhandeln 
oder, wie beim WTO-Beitritt, die Integration zu verlangsamen. Gründe dafür 
liegen in der negativen Einstellung wichtiger Teile der russischen Elite gegenü-
ber internationaler Integration, im Interesse, bessere Bedingungen auszuhandeln, 
und in der fehlenden Umsetzung wichtiger Wirtschaftsreformen. Der wachsende 
staatliche Einfluss in der Wirtschaft, verbunden mit einem hohen Regulations-
bedürfnis der russischen Politik, verhindert das Entstehen von Vertrauen in die 
russische Wirtschaft. Vertrauen jedoch ist wichtig, um internationale Investitionen 
anzuziehen. 
Die aktuelle globale Finanzkrise hat die Strukturmängel der russischen Wirtschaft 
bloßgelegt und zeigt, wie abhängig Russland von internationalen Entwicklungen 
ist. Russland ist durch die Krise doppelt betroffen: Einerseits hat sich der internati-
onale Kreditmarkt für russische Unternehmen praktisch geschlossen. Andererseits 
ist der Ölpreis von seinem Höchststand von 147 Dollar auf  weniger als 50 Dollar 
pro Barrel gefallen. Damit wurde die Achillesferse des russischen Wirtschaftssys-
tems getroffen: die große Abhängigkeit von Auslandskrediten und einem hohen 
internationalen Ölpreis. Wenn die russische Führung nicht fähig ist, die aus der 
Finanzkrise resultierenden Probleme zu lösen, könnte sie ihre Legitimität gegenü-
ber der eigenen Bevölkerung verlieren. Russland steht vor enormen inneren Her-
ausforderungen bei der Modernisierung und wird weiterhin in hohem Maße von 
externen Faktoren abhängen.
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Growth without Sustainability
What the financial crisis says about Russia’s economy
by Stefan Meister
The growth of  the price of  oil since 1999 was the prerequisite for the economic 
and political stabilization of  Russia. As a result the international influence of  
Russia has increased. The enormous economic growth is the basis for a new self-
confidence among the Russian elite concerning foreign policy. During the last few 
years, Russia has serviced its foreign debts and built up a constantly growing sta-
bility fund. Thus the country has gained room to maneuver internationally and to 
participate in the mediation of  international conflicts.
But there are still considerable shortcomings in implementing comprehensive 
reforms of  the economic structure by the Russian leadership. Corruption and 
inefficient administrative structures, including the increasing influence of  the state 
on the economy, have hindered fundamental reforms. The high price of  oil has 
contributed to delaying the readiness for more reforms in the short term. The Rus-
sian leadership did not use the years of  growth to set important reform impulses. 
The major challenges for the Russian economic policy are to diversify its produc-
tion structure, to stimulate private investment in all areas of  the economy, and to 
increase public funding for infrastructure, the health system and education.
In terms of  the international framework, Russia intends to integrate itself  in all 
important economic institutions and be on equal footing with other members. At 
the same time, for instance in the energy sector, Russia aims to either renegotiate 
the rules or, like with the WTO-accession, slow down the process. This is due to 
the increasing misgivings of  parts of  the elite about international integration, the 
interest to negotiate better conditions and the delaying of  important economic 
reforms. The intervention of  politics in the economy linked with a high regulation 
requirement undermines the build-up of  trust in Russian economic policies. 
The global financial crisis has uncovered the shortcomings of  the Russian eco-
nomic structure and shows how Russia is dependent on international develop-
ments. Russia is affected by the crisis in two ways: first, the international credit 
markets have been closed off  to Russian companies; additionally, the price of  oil 
declined from its peak of  $ 147 to less than $ 50 per barrel. Thus, the two Achilles 
heels of  the Russian economic system have been hit: a significant dependency on 
foreign credits and a high international price of  oil. If  the Russian leadership is not 
able to resolve the problems emerging with the financial crisis, it can lose its legiti-
macy. Russia faces substantial modernization challenges in its domestic policy and 
will continue to depend largely on external factors.
Summary
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Linking foreign and economic 
policy
During the presidency of  Vladimir Putin the inter-
national influence of  Russia has increased. This 
is due to soaring prices for oil and gas and the 
stabilization of  the Russian state. The enormous 
economic growth is the basis for a new foreign 
policy self-confidence of  the Russian elite. Sergei 
Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, describes this 
view as a “return of  Russia to global politics, global 
economy and the financial world as an active and 
full-valued player.”1 Part of  this self-conception is 
the idea to establish Moscow as an international 
finance centre and the ruble as a leading currency. 
During the last few years, Russia has serviced its 
foreign debts and built up a constantly growing 
stability fund. Thus the country has gained room 
to maneuver internationally and participate in the 
mediation in international conflicts. The pres-
ent-day Russia would like to integrate itself  in all 
important international institutions and concur-
rently to renegotiate the rules of  political and eco-
nomic relations.
At the same time, Russia tries to develop an alter-
native alliance policy towards the West in order to 
fulfill its aspirations as an independent great power. 
It has tried to convert its energy power into real 
political influence—with partial success. Thereby, it 
is looking for new international partners who con-
stitute an alternative to the United States’ influence 
in the world. These are states like China, India, and 
countries of  the Middle East and South America. 
Thus Russia has used the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) to superficially cooperate with 
China and Central Asian States on matters of  ter-
rorism. However, the organization’s prime interest 
and its main common denominator is to keep the 
US out of  the region. Iran, India and Pakistan have 
an observer status in the SCO. 
Nevertheless, Russia’s influence in international 
relations is limited, because it is lacking instruments 
to implement its policy effectively. Russia’s attrac-
tiveness as a soft power is limited. Its influence is 
constrained to developments in the region of  the 
former Soviet Union only. There Moscow reacts 
aggressively, especially with regard to changes and 
influences from outside, as the example of  the 
latest conflict in the Caucasus has shown. Until 
now, Moscow preferred the preservation of  the 
status quo in the region. The war in Georgia may 
be the beginning of  a more active policy within 
the former Soviet empire, while Moscow tries to 
resolve conflicts in its interest. Signs of  this can 
be observed in its more active involvement in the 
conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria 
recently. 
Results of eight years economic 
growth
The foundation for the new self-confidence is the 
economic development since 2000. For eight years, 
the Russian economy has been growing between 
5% and 8% per year. This economic growth has 
one central source: two thirds of  the export rev-
enues and half  of  the federal budget stem from the 
export of  oil and gas. For this reason, the Russian 
economy is highly dependent on the international 
price of  oil, which has constantly increased until 
the summer of  2008. Ensuing from these revenues 
is the rise in consumption and the growth of  
foreign investment, especially during the last few 
years. Trade is the driving force behind the Russian 
economic growth and is closely intertwined with 
a growing middle class. In 2007 the consumption 
increased by 13%, supported by a 16% growth 
rate of  wages.2 As a consequence thereof, we can 
observe a structural change towards the moderniza-
tion of  the service sector during the last few years. 
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Nevertheless it is first of  all the global market and 
not the national one that supplies the Russians with 
brand products. Russian products still have a com-
petition problem, not so much because of  the price 
but due to quality, reliability and marketing. For 
this reason, the import of  finished goods, techni-
cal equipment, cars and machines for the industry 
has grown. Russia constantly reduces its positive 
balance of  trade and will possibly import more 
than it exports in a couple of  years. The bulk of  
Russian exports are raw materials and energy prod-
ucts, which are growing slower than the imports. 
Increasing demand for raw material and the con-
sumption can attract more foreign investment in 
the next years. On the other hand, Russia has high 
custom tariffs on oil and gas revenues as well as an 
unfavorable business climate in the energy sector 
with high taxes and a strong influence by the state. 
In 2007, the industrial production increased by 
only 6%. This sector has principally lower growth 
rates than the raw material and service sectors: 
In 2005 and 2006, it stagnated by 4%, last year it 
increased to 4,7%.3 The growth can be explained 
by the domestic demand. However Russia plays no 
role on the international market for technological 
innovation and engineering because of  a lack of  
competitiveness.
The third pillar of  the economic growth is foreign 
investment, which increased by 21% to $ 121 bn in 
2007 (direct foreign investment $ 28 bn).4 Admit-
tedly, compared with other growing regions the 
level of  growth is low: In 2007 India has had an 
investment growth rate of  34%, South Korea of  
38% and China grew by 42%.5 Nevertheless, if  
investment conditions are improved, Russia may 
experience a boom in the next few years. Most of  
the investment is for raw material industry, trans-
port and telecommunication. In 2007, all invest-
ment into the raw material industry increased, but 
investment into industrial production declined. 
Tax policy and stability fund
During the last few years, the government has 
set important impulses in the realms of  tax and 
finance policy so as to provide for times of  crisis. 
As of  now, the Ministry of  Finance under Aleksei 
Kudrin has rejected demands by the Duma and the 
broad public for higher state expenditures. Because 
of  the high tax revenues from selling oil and gas, 
the federal budget generated high surpluses. Since 
January 1, 2004, a great share of  the revenues flows 
into the stability fund, which will stabilize the fed-
eral budget if  the price of  oil decreases to $ 27. 
If  the stability fund surpasses the level of  500 bn 
rubles, the money can be used for other aims. This 
point was reached in 2005, and thus the Russian 
government has used the money to pay back its 
foreign debt. As of  the end of  January 2008 the 
stability fund included nearly $ 160 bn—twice as 
much as by the end of  2006.6 The national foreign 
debt decreased to only 3% of  the GDP or $ 38 bn 
in the beginning of  2008. Besides this amortization, 
$ 1.04 bn have been designated for the national 
pension fund to cover the accrued pension deficit.7 
Furthermore, the wages in the public sector have 
been rising.
Since February 1, 2008, the stabilization fund has 
been used to found a national reserve fund and 
a national charity fund. The former is to secure 
Macroeconomic Indicators
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
GDP  %-change 10,0 5,1 4,7 7,3 7,2 6,4 7,4 8,1 7,3*
Industrial production, %- change 11,9 2,9 3,1 8,9 7,3 4,0 3,9 6,3 3,7**
Fixed investments, %-change 17,4 10,0 2,8 12,5 13,7 10,9 16,7 21,1 11,3**
Exports, bn. $ 105,0 101,9 107,3 135,9 183,2 243,6 304,5 355,2 442,7**
Imports, bn. $ 44,9 53,8 61,0 76,1 97,4 125,3 163,9 223,1 268,0**
Unemployment, % 9,9 8,7 9,0 8,7 7,6 7,7 6,9 6,1 6,6***
Population, mln persons, Jan. 1st 146,9 146,3 145,6 145,0 144,2 143,5 142,8 142,1 142,0
Quelle: .BOFIT,37 .*1-9/08, .**1-11/08, .***11/08
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the budget if  the price of  oils decline, the latter 
should, in the short term, help to resolve the defi-
cit of  financing pensions. On the one hand, this 
money should be invested in foreign currency; on 
the other hand it should be invested in the interna-
tional financial market. On the 1 December 2008, 
the reserve fund contained $ 133 bn8 and the char-
ity fund $ 76 bn.9
Innovations as means for  
modernizing the economy
A sustainable economic development needs to 
reduce its dependency on the export of  raw materi-
als as well as to grow on the basis of  competitive 
industries. The major challenge for the Russian eco-
nomic policy is to diversify its production structure, 
to stimulate investment in all areas of  the economy 
and to increase of  public funding for infrastructure, 
the health system and education. 
Education as a key
The lack of  specialists in particular slows down 
the growth in some economic sectors. The situ-
ation will worsen further, if  the age cohorts with 
a low birth rate leave the institutes of  education. 
The number of  pupils in Russian schools has fallen 
between 1997 and 2008 from 22 million students 
to 13. Furthermore Russia has a restrictive migra-
tion policy because of  traditional reservations.10 As 
a consequence Russia has more illegal migration 
of  low qualified persons from Central Asia, the 
Caucasus and China than of  much-needed high-
qualified manpower. Problems in the education 
and science sector arise because of  the inefficient 
use of  resources, the lack of  coordination between 
higher education institutions and the industry, and 
the state-dominated budget. The underfunding and 
commercialization of  education in the 1990s led 
to a decline of  quality in education. The innova-
tive ability of  Russian research has been declining 
despite increases in state funding. The number of  
patent applications has been falling for years. With 
less than 1% of  the market, Russia plays no role on 
the international market for high technology.
The four Is
Already before his election, the Russian president 
Dmitri Medvedev explained on the 5th Kras-
noyarsk economy forum in February 2008 his 
economy program and defined his political goals. 
On the basis of  four Is—institutions (state/civil 
society), infrastructure, innovation and invest-
ment—the Russian leadership seeks to achieve 
a modernization of  its economy away from the 
one-sided dependency on raw material. Connected 
to this is the strengthening of  an independent judi-
ciary, combating corruption, limiting bureaucracy, 
tax decreases, construction of  an independent 
finance system as well as investment in the infra-
structure, technological innovations and the social 
system.11 Medvedev’s demands do not essentially 
differ from statements of  his predecessor Vladimir 
Putin, but he set somewhat different priorities. 
First of  all, his accentuation of  freedom in form 
of  personal and economic freedom contradicts the 
previous policy.
Basically, with regard to its reform policy, the Rus-
sian leadership will have to find a balance between 
the different interests of  the political elites and will 
have to take into account the interests of  the more 
liberal and the more state oriented wings. A central 
task for the government is to convince a major-
ity of  the Russian population that further market 
liberalization and competition is needed. As in 
questions of  competitiveness and corruption, there 
is a need for mentality to change. To achieve the 
goal of  doubling the GDP on the basis of  innova-
tion and not raw material, as it is announced in the 
socio-economic concept up to 2020, the state has 
to draw back from central areas of  the economy.12 
The main challenge for President Medvedev and a 
central part of  his policy is to combat corruption. 
According to Transparency International, Russia 
belonged to the most corrupt countries, ranked 121 
out of  163 countries in 2006 and in 2007 143 out 
of  179 countries.13 The national plan to combat 
corruption, prepared by the head of  the Kremlin 
administration Sergei Naryshkin, is based on three 
principles: firstly, the legislation should be modern-
ized and the independence of  courts strengthened, 
thereby targeting the restriction of  the immunity of  
high state officials. Secondly, the public administra-
DGAPanalyse | January 2009
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tion should be modernized, accompanied by the 
removal of  bureaucrats from the board of  direc-
tors of  large state enterprises. The third element of  
the concept is to strengthen the sense of  right and 
wrong within the public with help from the media 
and NGOs.14 There is a gap between rhetoric and 
the action of  the government. The analysis of  the 
problems is good, but the practical consequences 
are very meager.
The Global Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis began in the US real 
estate market and, in the beginning, had no serious 
impact on Russia. On one hand, this can be seen 
as the result of  little investment by Russian banks 
in bad credit deals; on the other hand, it shows the 
poor integration of  the Russian finance institutions 
into the world economy. In the meantime, however, 
Russian enterprises have lost enormously on the 
stock exchange. Moscow’s RTS and MICEX fell 
65% in a couple of  weeks.15 They have been closed 
temporarily and the government has rescued two 
banks. The crisis shows how Russia is dependent 
on international developments. 
Russia is affected by the crisis in two ways: first, the 
international credit markets have been closed com-
pletely for Russian companies and foreign investors 
have withdrawn $ 80 bn from Russia. Second, due 
to recession fears, the price of  oil declined from 
its peak of  $ 145 in July 2008 to less than $ 50 per 
barrel.16 Still in October 2008, Prime Minister Vlad-
imir Putin stated that Russia was not affected by 
the crisis. Since then, however, the Russian govern-
ment has established a crisis package with a value 
of  more than $ 210 bn.17 
Aside from the high prices for raw materials, the 
Russian economic growth since 2001 has been 
based on high domestic demand and foreign invest-
ment. While the Russian government built up cur-
rency reserves of  $ 560 bn in the last few years, 
Russian banks and companies accumulated debts 
abroad of  $ 450 bn.18 While private households 
financed their consumption with credits, Russia’s 
big companies—also in the energy sector like Gaz-
prom—financed additional purchases within Russia 
and abroad by loans. Right now, however, these 
debts are falling due; in 2009 alone, $ 115 bn have 
to be payed.19 While big energy companies like 
Gazprom have stopped investment projects, Rus-
sian oligarchs are obliged to sell their foreign shares 
in order to pay back their credit debt. According 
to Bloomberg, the 25 richest Russians lost one 
third of  their assets by mid October on the stock 
exchange, which equates to more than $ 230 bn.20
Because of  the lack of  trust in Russian policy, the 
outflow of  money from Russia has intensified. This 
is a result of  the war in Georgia which has led to 
substantial uncertainties worldwide and because of  
an increasing influence of  the Russian state within 
the realm of  the domestic economy. This policy 
is reflected in the reclamation of  important raw 
material deposits by Russian state companies and 
by the pressure of  the Russian administration in 
the last few years. Further examples are the forced 
formation of  state holdings in important strategic 
branches since the end of  2007 and a law passed in 
April 2008 on the restriction of  foreign investment 
in 42 strategic branches. Recently, Prime Minis-
ter Putin’s mere criticism of  the steel and mining 
company Mechel and its pricing policy resulted in a 
drop of  the Mechel share price by over 30% after 
Putin threatened a reaction of  the trust and finance 
administrations.
Because of  the expected international recession, 
the price of  oil, gas and metals has fallen sharply 
in the last few weeks. Raw materials are the most 
important exports of  Russia; oil alone is responsi-
ble for one third of  the Russian state revenues. The 
problems now stem from the failure to decrease 
the state’s dependence on oil and gas revenues. As 
a result, ongoing and planned investment projects 
for the development of  new deposits have partly 
been stopped due to lack of  financing. Further-
more, many of  these planned projects are only 
worth developing at a price of  oil between $ 90 
and $ 100 because of  the climate conditions. This 
is also the case with the gas field Shtokman in the 
Barents Sea, which should supply the North Stream 
Pipeline in the future. In October, the major energy 
companies Gazprom, Rosneft, Lukoil and TNK-
BP received $ 9 bn from the state to support their 
debt service. Additionally, Russian Minister of  
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Finance, Aleksei Kudrin, reduced taxes and cus-
toms expenses to support the companies.
The deficit of  the credit market and the decline 
of  demand has by now reached the real economy 
and led to a decrease in production. The building 
sector and car industry are in particular affected. 
After Russian companies lost half  of  their value 
on the stock market, the central bank and the 
Ministry of  Finance intervened and bought stocks 
back. The central bank and National Charity Fund 
injected 950 bn rubles for five years into the big-
gest state banks Sberbank, VTB and VEB in order 
to give liquidity to the economy.21 As a result, the 
influence of  the state will increase even further. 
These developments could negatively influence 
the effectiveness of  President Medvedev’s planned 
modernization program. The program is intended 
to facilitate investment in the infrastructure and key 
technologies. Critics also consider the budget for 
2009 as being underfunded because it is based on 
an assumed price of  oil of  $ 80–90.
Russian Foreign Economic Policy
For the success of  the economic reform policy it is 
especially important to analyze the Russia’s strategy 
for integration in international economic institu-
tions. With its foreign economic policy, Russia 
wishes to integrate in all important financial institu-
tions of  the West and to participate on an equal 
level. This includes access to the WTO, OECD and 
a close cooperation with the World Bank. Accord-
ing to a strategy paper of  the Russian Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, Russia wants to strengthen its posi-
tion in the area of  environmental protection and 
wishes to modernize its economy on the basis of  
ecological technology.22 But there is a gap between 
aspiration and reality: Russia is neither a pioneer in 
implementing the Kyoto protocol, nor in develop-
ing measures of  energy efficiency. As for the WTO, 
it would appear that the Russian government is less 
interested in a constructive consent but in bargain-
ing for maxing out its positions and slowing down 
the negotiations. The central question is whether 
Russia is willing to obey international agreements 
and norms, and to make sure that they translate 
into national law. 
Example 1: The European Energy Charter
Russia intends to negotiate new treaties with the 
West, where security and economic questions 
are concerned. For instance Russia deems the 
European Energy Charter to be against Russian 
interests. At the same time Moscow wants to influ-
ence the rules and not adapt to an existing system 
without renewed negotiations. The influential head 
of  the Russian Gas Society, Valeri Yazev, claims 
that future relations between Russia and the EU 
in the energy field should be based on a general 
legal understanding and a special political coopera-
tion. For an easier cooperation, Russia should be 
awarded observer status in all European organiza-
tions regulating energy. Yazev criticized the Energy 
Charter for subjugating neighboring countries to 
EU principles without considering their needs.23 
It is a fact that parts of  the Energy Charter are not 
in the interest of  Russia and other oil and gas pro-
ducing countries. Because of  the transit protocol, 
it was not ratified by Norway, states in the Middle 
East and Australia. Russia is concerned that with 
the acceptance of  the transit protocol, Central 
Asian states will be allowed to transport their oil 
and gas through the Russian pipeline system. As a 
result, the Russian transport monopoly would be 
undermined. However, it is in Russia’s best inter-
est to invest in the European energy market and 
the infrastructure required to reach the consumer 
with reliable energy delivery. Thus, this must be an 
opening of  the Russian energy market, which has 
been politicized in the context of  the discussion on 
the Energy Charter. Russia’s tactics show a pref-
erence for bilateral negotiations and agreements 
with single countries, companies and politicians, as 
opposed to negotiating or participating in interna-
tionally valid treaties. This applies not only to the 
energy sector. The result is a lack of  transparency 
and a degree of  mistrust of  Russian policy and 
investment.
The North Stream Pipeline project, for example, 
has been viewed as a German-Russian project, 
arousing concern particularly in the Baltic States 
and Poland from the beginning. The strategy of  
Gazprom to supply not only Germany, but all of  
Western Europe, was no part of  the discussion. 
Here it would have been in Russian (and German) 
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interests from the beginning not to cause anxiety 
and not to give rise to a politicization of  energy 
supply but to deliver more transparency and bind-
ing agreements.
Example 2: Russia and the WTO
President Medvedev emphasized in his speech 
in Berlin in June 2008 the importance of  WTO 
accession for his country. Yet there are increasing 
doubts if  Russia really has the political will to do 
so. After the agreement with the US in the end of  
June 2006, joining WTO seemed close. Since that 
time, however, Moscow has been slowing down the 
implementation. Examples of  the hesitation are 
the tripling of  agricultural aids to $ 9 bn in 2008 
and the increase of  export tariffs for wood in 2007, 
which especially affects the Scandinavian states. 
Saudi Arabia continues to criticize the low price 
of  gas granted to Russian industry.24 This shows 
a direct contradiction of  economic decisions and 
international agreements. For the Russian govern-
ment, it is still more important to regulate and close 
the domestic markets than to accept international 
agreements. In Russia, skepticism is growing about 
whether joining WTO will bring the desired ben-
efits and whether Moscow will lose control over 
some areas of  the economy because of  it.
The WTO-accession is considered to be an impor-
tant instrument for the economic development of  
a country with influence on the customer policy, 
investor rights, agriculture and intellectual prop-
erty. It has direct influence on the implementation 
of  reforms in areas such as trade, foreign direct 
investment, as well as institutional change, and is 
an important means of  reform towards an open 
trade and investment policy. David Tarr, the for-
mer chief  economist of  the World Bank, maintains 
that Russia’s central advantage of  the WTO-acces-
sion is the implementation of  important domestic 
reforms. It was not until the Russian leadership 
under president Putin declared the WTO-accession 
to be a priority that the negotiation process started 
to be successful.25 
Recently, however, the political support on the 
highest level seems to have weakened. This devel-
opment can be explained with justified concerns 
that if  Russia joins the WTO, it must reduce its 
high tariffs and most of  Russian enterprises will no 
longer be able to compete. Furthermore foreign 
companies will get easier entry to the Russian mar-
ket and the Russian government will no longer be 
able to influence this development. The head of  
the Russian Federation Council, Sergei Mitronov, 
summarized the issue as follows: the later Russia 
joins the WTO, the better it would be for Russian 
national interests. Mitronov explains his position 
by pointing out that Russia needs more time to 
prepare her non-competitive economic sectors like 
agriculture, industry, and the banking and insurance 
system for international competition.26 He there-
fore confirms the wish of  the Russian leadership to 
join WTO, but he acknowledges the lacking com-
petitiveness of  the Russian economy. 
Results
The increasing price of  oil since 1999 was the pre-
requisite for the economic and political stabilization 
of  Russia. Admittedly, the Russian government 
has made promising decisions like the foundation 
of  a stability fund and the paying back of  foreign 
debt. However, there still is a considerable short-
coming in implementing comprehensive reforms 
of  Russia’s economic structure. The high price of  
oil has contributed to delaying the readiness for 
more reforms in the short term. Russia has not 
sold manufactured goods, but only raw materi-
als in the last few years. The Russian leadership 
did not use the years of  growth to set important 
reform impulses. The central challenge of  the next 
few years is to implement an economic strategy 
that will bring growth despite lower prices for oil 
and gas. The Putin-Medvedev tandem needs to 
adjust the Russian economy on the basis of  inter-
national competitiveness. Ideas and plans exist and 
are being discussed by the leadership. They span 
from combating corruption, supporting small and 
medium-size business and the creation of  inde-
pendent courts to the modernization of  education 
and research. However, it is still not clear if  the 
president and the government are able and willing 
to implement these programs. The resistance of  
the bureaucracy and some elite groups has brought 
several good reform ideas to a halt in the past.
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International comparison shows that Russia holds 
the third largest currency deposit after China and 
Japan.27 Thus, Russia today is better equipped to 
combat the current financial crisis than was the 
case in 1998. The Russian economic journal Expert 
estimates that the economic crisis is a chance for 
a more healthy growth of  the Russian economy: 
the next month will decide whether the Russian 
government uses the crisis to change the rules in 
the interest of  the whole economy or whether it 
will further support mostly large state companies.28 
One of  the most pronounced problems of  the 
Russian economy is the increasing influence of  the 
bureaucracy in all areas linked with inefficient use 
of  money and persistent corruption. 
In the international framework, Russia intends to 
integrate itself  in all important economic institu-
tions and be on equal footing. At the same time, 
for instance in the energy sector, Russia aims 
to either renegotiate the rules or, like with the 
WTO-accession, to slow down the process. This 
is due to the skepticism of  parts of  the elite about 
international integration, the interest to negotiate 
better conditions and the delaying of  important 
economic reforms. The intervention of  politics in 
the economy linked with high regulation require-
ments undermines the build-up of  trust in Russian 
economic policies. Consequently, Moscow faces the 
challenge of  explaining its policies to international 
institutions and it fosters mistrust of  governments, 
which are skeptical about the expansion of  Russian 
enterprises.
Trust is particularly important in order to succeed 
in international economic policy, and Dmitri Med-
vedev should have used the positive reactions on 
his first conceptual speeches to achieve more trust. 
It is to his disadvantage that he has a weak position 
within the Russian elite whose main interest is their 
domestic image. Different rules apply in Russia than 
on the international stage. Yet to reach its reform 
goals Russia has to adapt international rules and to 
open its economy. Only if  concept papers become 
laws that are implemented by an efficient bureau-
cracy will the Russian reform policy see success. 
International relations cooperation with Russia is 
not difficult because Russia is too strong, but rather 
because it is too weak to act as a reliable partner. 
After the 1990s, Russia feels humbled and now 
overestimates its possibilities because of  the posi-
tive economic developments of  the last eight years. 
At the same time, its aggressive attitude towards 
the West, NATO and the US has helped to stabilize 
and legitimize the existing regime. The increasing 
price of  oil has masked the structural weakness of  
the Russian economy. The global financial crisis 
has brought these issues to light. Russia faces sub-
stantial modernization challenges in its domestic 
policy and will continue to depend largely on exter-
nal factors. Finally, the harsh political rhetoric of  
the Russian leadership should also not cloud our 
understanding of  the country.
Dr. Stefan Meister, Programmmitarbeiter 
Russland / Eurasien, DGAP.
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